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HOMER J. HOSTETTER, .Appellant, v. JOHN H . .ALDER-
SON et al., Respondents. 
[1] Administrative Law-Court Review of Administrative Action 
-Remedies.-While an action for declaratory relief is not 
appropriate for review of an administrative order, the com-
plaint may be regarded as a petition for a writ of mandate. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Fire Department--Removal of Mem-
bers- Complaint and Charges. -Complaint or charge filed 
against city fireman for "physical inability to properly per-
form the duties required of all uniformed personnel, ... such 
inability caused by illness incurred not in line of duty as 
determined by competent medical authority after thorough 
examination," is sufficiently specific to permit the accused to 
identify the transaction, understand the nature of the alleged 
offense, and prepare and present his defense; it is not neces-
sary to plead the facts concerning his illness, its nature, cause, 
and duration. 
[3] Id.- Fire Department- Removal of Members- Grounds.-
Los Angeles city charter, § 182, declaring that a fireman 
may not be deprived of his position except for sufficient cause 
shown on a finding of guilty of the specific charge assigned, 
is not intended merely to provide a means of disciplinary 
action for an offense committed; loss of efficiency to the fire 
department, rather than personal fault or misconduct, is the 
primary consideration, and physical disability resulting from 
illness not incurred in line of duty may be a sufficient cause 
for removal. 
[ 4] Id.-Fire Department--Retirement of Members.-Los Angeles 
city charter, § 182, providing for retirement of firemen dis-
abled in line of duty, does not apply to a fireman whose illness 
was not service connected. 
[5] Id.-Fire Department--Removal of Members-Hearing.-City 
fireman charged with physical inability properly to perform 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 199; Am.Jur., Public 
Administrative Law, § 231. 
[3] Physical or mental disability as disqualification or ground 
of removal or impeachment of public officer, note, 28 A.L.R. 777. 
See, also, Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 151; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§ 194. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Administrative Law, § 19; [2-6] Mu-
nicipal Corporations, § 324(2). 
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the duties of his position was not found guilty solely on 
hearsay evidence where he admitted his inability to perform 
his duties and pleaded guilty to the charge against him. 
[6] !d.-Fire Department-Removal of Members-Hearing.-City 
fireman charged with physical inability properly to perform 
the duties of his position was afforded a fair and impartial 
hearing where he was given every opportunity to present his 
case in person and by counsel of his own choosing, and where 
there is no allegation or showing of bad faith or oppression 
on the part of the board hearing the charge . 
.APPE.AL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
.Angeles County. Charles .A. Paulsen, Judge.* .Affirmed . 
.Action seeking restoration to position in city fire depart-
ment. Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
George E. Cryer and R. .Alston J"ones for .Appellant. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City .Attorney (Los .Angeles), Bourke 
Jones, .Assistant City .Attorney, George William .Adams and 
John F. Feldmeier, Deputy City .Attorneys, for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-Homer J. Hostetter was removed from 
his position as a fireman of the city of Los .Angeles following 
a hearing before the board of rights. He then filed in the 
superior court a complaint for declaratory relief. .After 
trial, judgment was entered against him upon the ground 
that he was legally discharged. His appeal is from that judg-
ment. 
Hostetter's complaint names as defendants the city of 
Los .Angeles and John H . .Alderson, chief engineer and gen-
eral manager of its fire department. The relief demanded 
is restoration to his position with full pay from the date 
of his removal. [1] .An action for declaratory relief is not 
appropriate for review of an administrative order. (See 
lOth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, 
137.) However, the complaint may be regarded as a peti-
tion for a writ of mandate. (See Boren v. State Personnel 
Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 638 [234 P.2d 981] .) 
Hostetter alleges that .Alderson issued an order temporarily 
relieving him from duty pending a hearing and decision by 
the board of rights on charges preferred under section 135 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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of the charter of the city of Los Angeles. The charges, as 
set forth in the order served upon Hostetter, are: "For your 
physical inability to properly perform the duties required 
of all uniformed personnel, at the expiration of your vaca-
tion . . . as provided in section 132 of the Rules and Regu-
lations governing the department, such inability caused by 
illness incurred not in line of duty as determined by com-
petent medical authority after thorough examination.'' 
Other allegations of the complaint are that at the board 
of rights hearing only hearsay evidence was introduced as 
to his physical ability. Following the hearing, the board 
found him "guilty" and fixed the "penalty" to be imposed 
as "removal" from his position. Later, certain claims and 
demands for compensation and reinstatement and a request 
for rehearing by the board were filed. In conclusion, Hostetter 
asserts that a controversy exists as to the validity and effect 
of the proceedings against him. 
In their answer, Alderson and the city state that Hostetter 
was present in person and represented by counsel of his own 
choosing at the board hearing and that he admitted his guilt 
of the charges filed against him. There was no objection to 
any of the evidence offered or received and Hostetter intro-
duced evidence on his own behalf. 
The record of the board hearing shows that Hostetter was 
present with counsel. Offered the opportunity of pleading 
guilty or not guilty, he replied: ''Gentlemen, as the service 
demands fire duty, my answer is guilty, however if the ser-
vice demands other duties my answer is not guilty and I 
would like my representative to explain this more fully." 
His counsel then elaborated, saying, " ... yes the boy is 
guilty as charged in the Rules and Regulations read by you 
in which it says it may demand the duties of him as a part 
of the Fire Department . . . I would like at this time to 
enter a plea of guilty to the charges and ask for a suspension 
from the department of six months, at the expiration of such 
time he will have to submit to a complete medical examina-
tion . . . if he is found capable of performing fire duty he 
will be restored at that time.'' 
In effect, Hostetter's defense at the hearing was that he 
was too ill to perform full duties; however, he could do light 
work and at some future time return to full duty. He intro-
duced into evidence letters from various doctors indicating 
that improvement in his condition might be expected. The 
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record shows that he had requested, and been denied, an addi-
tional leave of absence to recover his health. 
It appears that less than two weeks after completing his 
period of probation and becoming a fireman, Hostetter was 
discovered to be suffering from hyperthyroidism. Since that 
time he has been absent from duty 154 days. He received 
repeated leaves and vacations to permit him to attempt to 
recover his health. He was advised by his superiors to see)>: 
employment better suited to his physical condition and to 
resign from the force. Numerous records, reports and letters 
were introduced indicating Hostetter's unfitness for duty, 
the leaves which had been accorded him, and the treatment 
which he had received. One of his superiors testified that, 
during the period Hostetter was on active duty, he was a 
good fireman. In determining ''the proper penalty to be 
prescribed,'' the board examined his personal file in his pres-
ence. 
Following a trial before the court without a jury, the su-
perior court rendered a declaratory judgment denying Hostet-
ter any relief and holding that he had been legally discharged 
from his position for good and sufficient cause upon a fair 
and regular hearing. 
Hostetter contends that the board of rights was without 
jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing because the com-
plaint does not state a charge against him under section 135 
of the city charter. He claims first that the complaint does 
not contain a statement in clear and concise language of all 
the facts constituting the charge, and second, that physical 
disability is not a ground for dismissal within the meaning 
of the charter section. The other points relied upon are that 
he was not afforded a fair and impartial hearing and that 
he was convicted solely on hearsay evidence. 
[2] Hostetter's first objection is to the grammatical con-
struction of the charge filed against him. He contends that 
it is not a complete sentence, but a mere series of phrases 
not constituting a charge of any kind. However, despite 
grammatical weakness, the charge clearly and concisely 
states that Hostetter does not have the physical ability prop-
erly to perform his duties. It is sufficiently specific to per-
mit the accused to identify the transaction, understand the 
nature of the alleged offense, and prepare and present his 
defense. ( Gipner v. State Civil Service Com., 13 Cal.App.2d 
100, 107 [56 P.2d 535].) It was not necessary to plead the 
facts concerning his illness, its nature, cause, and duration. 
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The decisive question is whether the charter provides for 
dismissal because of physical difficulties. 
Hostetter contends that physical disability is not a suf-
ficient cause for removal under section 135 of the charter 
of the city of Los Angeles. His position is that this section 
is intended to provide a means of disciplinary action for an 
offense committed by a fireman, and that physical illness 
cannot be properly described as misconduct. He relies upon 
specific wording in the charter as tending to support his 
claim. 
Paragraph one of section 135 provides that no officer or 
employee may be "suspended, removed, deprived of his office 
or position, or otherwise separated from the service of the 
Fire Department (other than by resignation), except for 
good and sufficient cause shown upon a finding of 'guilty' 
of the specific charge or charges assigned . . . '' after a proper 
hearing before the board of rights. (Italics added.) The 
paragraph further specifies that the charge must be based 
upon some act committed or omitted within one year prior 
to the filing of the complaint. 
Paragraph 12 of the same section prescribes the procedure 
to be followed in the hearing before the board of rights. "The 
departmental personal history and records of the accused 
shall not be available to the Board of Rights except and only 
in such cases where the accused has been found guilty of 
any charge upon which he was heard or tried by the Board 
of Rights, then only for the purpose of determining a proper 
penalty to be prescribed; provided, however, that in prescrib-
ing such penalty the said board must look to the nature and 
gravity of the offense of which the accused has been found 
guilty and may at its discretion review the departmental 
personal history and record of such accused. . . . '' From 
"penalty" and "gravity of the offense'' Hostetter concludes 
that the section is to be confined to one of punishment for 
misconduct. 
[3] Although the phraseology of section 135 is somewhat 
inartistic, it does not necessarily mean that by inclusion of 
language possibly indicating a primary intent to ,punish for 
misconduct, inability to perform the duties of the position 
should not also be ground for removal. A comparable pro-
vision is found in the Governmrnt Coqe in sections 19570 et 
seq. which concern disciplinary proceedings before the Civil 
Service Commission. Section 19570 defines ''punitive action'' 
as dismssal, demotion, suspension, or other disciplinary ac-
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tion. Section 19572, which for the most part enumerates acts 
of misconduct as cause for discipline, includes physical and 
mental disability. 
A more pertinent inquiry is that of the basic policies behind 
this type of charter provision. In other jurisdictions having 
municipal charter provisions similar to the present one, it 
has been held that the best efficiency is obtained in public 
service when personnel are selected according to qualifications 
and positions are retained without fear of removal for reasons 
of local politics. (White v. City of Hopkinsville, 280 Ky. 
661 [134 S.W.2d 236, 238] .) Courts have also upheld the 
policy that the public is best served when department offi-
cials are permitted to eliminate unqualified or undesirable 
personnel, and to replace them with persons better qualified. 
(City of Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630 [ 46 P .2d 334, 
336] ; Hunter v: Quick, 183 Okla. 19 [79 P.2d 590, 593] .) 
In numerous decisions, the discharge or retirement of 
public employees physically or mentally unable to perform 
the duties called for in their positions has been upheld. (See 
Annotation, 28 A.L.R. 777; Loucks v. Board of Education, 
258 App.Div. 1003 [16 N.Y.S.2d 733] ; Balacek v. Board of 
Trustees, 263 App.Div. 712 [30 N.Y.S.2d 1007] ; Sganga v. 
Teaneck Tp., 130 N.J.L. 218 [32 A.2d 505] ; School Dist. No.1 
v. Teachers' Retirement lhtnd Assn., 163 Ore. 103 [95 P.2d 
720, 96 P.2d 419, 125 A.L.R. 720]; In re Carney, 182 Va. 907 
[30 S.E.2d 789].) In Gentner v. Board of Education, 219 
Cal. 135 [25 P.2d 824], and Tilton v. Board of Education, 25 
Cal.App.2d 746 [78 P.2d 474], schoolteachers were retired 
because of physical disability. In the Tilton case, in com-
menting upon the Gentner decision, it was said: "The reason-
ing in that case dictates the conclusion that where, as in the 
instant case, the school board was justified in retiring a 
teacher because of physical disability to perform her duties, 
it became the board's duty to remove the teacher from the 
classroom, . . . Such a conclusion finds support in the basic 
principle underlying our school system-that the welfare of 
the children is the paramount consideration." (P. 749.) 
It is apparent that there is no fault on the part of Hos-
tetter or intimation that he has in any way been guilty 
of misconduct. But personal fault does not appear to be 
the primary consideration. Misconduct is important only 
insofar as it affects the efficiency of the department. The 
loss of efficiency to the department, and the detriment to 
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the public which would result from lack of authority to dis-
charge a physically disabled fireman, is a sound basis for con-
cluding that" sufficient cause" should be construed as physical 
disability resulting from illness not incurred in the line of 
duty. 
If section 135 is given the construction urged by Hostetter, 
the charter makes no provision for the suspension or removal 
of a fireman in his situation because of nonservice connected 
disability. [4] Hostetter argues that his was a case for 
retirement under section 182 and that he was entitled to 
a hearing before the Board of Pension Commissioners. How-
ever, that section applies only to a fireman disabled in the 
line of duty. Hostetter admits that his illness was not ser-
vice connected. 
Section 1821;4 provides for retirement of a fireman who is 
disabled other than in the line of duty, provided he has 
served in the department for five years or more since the 
date of his last appointment. Hostetter's illness occurred 
almost immediately following his appointment and his total 
length of service is considerably short of five years. 
Section 108 permits the transfer of physically disabled per-
sonnel to other civil service departments, but only in the 
event that the employee has served for at least three years, 
or has become disabled because of injury or illness resulting 
from the discharge of his duties. Hostetter meets neither 
qualification. 
[5] Hostetter argues that he was found guilty solely upon 
hearsay evidence. The record does not support his conten-
tion. He admitted his inability to perform his duties and 
pleaded guilty to the charge against him. No evidence was 
required or taken upon the question of guilt. The records 
and papers introduced were solely for the purpose of enabling 
the board to determine the penalty to be prescribed. 
[6] A thorough review of the record of the board hearing 
fails to disclose any unfairness therein. Hostetter was given 
every opportunity to present his case in person and by counsel 
of hili' own choosing. There is no allegation of bad faith or 
oppression on the part of the board, and none appears from 
the record. Hostetter's claim that Chief Alderson was un-
fairly prejudiced against him is not sustained by the evidence, 
nor is it shown that, even if such prejudice existed, it affected 
the decison of the board. 
As the uncontradicted evidence shows facts justifying Hos-
tetter's dismissal from the fire department, he is not entitled 
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to relief either in this action or by way of mandate. The 
judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, 0. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Section 135 ( 1) of the charter of the city of Los Angeles 
provides that: "The right of an officer or employee of the 
Fire Department to hold his office or position and to the 
compensation attached to such office or position is hereby 
declared to be a substantial property right of which he shall 
not be deprt>ued arbitrarily or summarily, nor otherwise than 
as herein in this section provided. No officer or employee of 
the Fire Department shall be sttspended, 1·ernoved, dep1·ived 
of his office or position, or otherw1:se sepamted from the ser-
vice of the Fire Department, (other than by resignation) 
except for good and sufficient cmtse shown upon a finding 
of 'guilty' of the specific charge or charges assigned as cause 
or causes therefor after a full, fair and impartial hearing 
before the Board of Rights . ... " It is also provided that 
the charge must be based on some act committed or omitted 
within one year prior to the filing of the complaint. 
Section 135(12) provides in part that the "Board of Rights, 
shall at the conclusion of the hearing, make its specific find-
ings of 'guilty' or 'not guilty' (on each specific charge) which 
must be based upon the evidence adduced before it at such 
hearing and not otherwise and render and certify its decision 
in writing.'' 
The only charge against plaintiff was that he was in ill 
health and unable to perform his duties because of physical 
disability. The two paragraphs of section 135 of the charter 
above quoted certainly connote some sort of misconduct. It 
appears to me that it takes quite a stretch of the imagination 
to say that one may be fmtnd "guilty" or "not guilty" of 
poor health. It most assuredly is not something over which 
an individual has any control. 
The majority, in holding that plaintiff may be removed 
from the fire department under the quoted provisions of the 
charter, say that a comparable provision is found in section 
19570 et seq. of the Government Code. I most emphatically 
do not agree. Section 19572 (e) of that code provides spe-
cifically that an employee may be disciplined for physical or 
mental disability. No such provision is made in the section 
here under consideration. 
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Section 182% of the charter provides for retirement of 
a :fireman who is disabled other than in the line of duty, pro-
vided he has served in the department for five years or more 
since the date of his last appointment. Plaintiff's illness 
oceurred shortly after he had served his probationary period 
and so he does not come within this provision. Section 108 
permits the transfer of physically disabled personnel to other 
civil service departments in the event that the employee 
has served for at least three years, or has become disabled 
because of service-connected disability. Plaintiff does not 
come within this category either, so there is very clearly a 
hiatus in the charter whieh the majority has filled by in-
dulging in judicial legislation. Since no provision was made 
for disability which was not service connected and which 
occurred prior to the five year period of service, this court 
decides that plaintiff can be removed from his position upon 
a finding of "guilty" of poor health. 
The majority opinion contains the following statement: 
''In numerous decisions, the discharge or retirement of pub-
lic employees physically or mentally unable to perform the 
duties called for in their positions has been upheld." This 
statement is allegedly supported by the following authorities 
which, in my opinion, are all distinguishable from the case 
under consideration. 
In In re Carney, 182 Va. 907 [30 S.E.2d 789], the act in-
volved provided that: "Whenever the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia shall have reasonable cause to believe that 
the judge of any court of record in this State ... is afflicted 
with an illness or disability, mental or physical, which renders 
such judge ... permanently incapacitated or incompetent 
to discharge the duties of his office, it shall be the duty of 
the Court to enter an order directing an inquiry to deter-
mine such judge's ... capacity and competency .... " (Ital-
ics added.) This case involved a situation where there was 
specific statutory authority for removal or retirement of the 
judge from office. 
In Sganga v. Teaneck Tp., 130 N.J.L. 218 [32 A.2d 505], 
there was no discharge involved. A police officer, due to de-
fective vision, was unable to perform any police duties other 
than desk work and the court held that the township was 
justified in denying him a pension and in putting him on sick 
leave at half salary. 
In Balacek v. Board of Trustees, 263 App.Div. 712 [30 
308 HosTETTER v. AI,DERSON [38 C.2d 
N.Y.S.2d 1007], a fireman who was found to be totally and 
permanently physically unfit for duty was retired, apparently 
at an annual pension. 
In Lo1wks v. Board of Education, 258 App.Div. 1003 [16 
N.Y.S.2d 733], a schoolteacher was dismissed for physical 
disability. But there is nothing in the case to show whether 
or not any particular legislative act was involved. 
In Gentner v. Board of Education, 219 Cal. 135 [25 P.2d 
824], a schoolteacher who had, because of the Teachers' 
Tenure Law, achieved the status of a "permanent teacher" 
was dismissed because of incompetence and unfitness to teach. 
The School Code in effect at that time (Stats. 1933, ch. 391, 
p. 1017) provided for dismissal for "immoral or unprofes-
sional conduct, commission or aiding or advocating the com-
mission of acts of criminal syndicalism . . . dishonesty, in-
competency, evident unfitness for service, persistent violation 
of or refusal to obey the school laws of California, or reason-
able regulations prescribed for the government of public 
schools." This case presents another example of dismissal 
in accordance with specific statutory authority. 
In Tilton v. Board of Education, 25 Cal.App.2d 746 [78 
P .2d 4 7 4], a teacher was retired for physical incapacity (de-
fective hearing) and the question presented for determina-
tion was whether she was to be given active employment from 
the date of her retirement until her dismissal at the end of 
the year. She was retired pursuant to the provisions of sec-
tion 5.890 of the School Code and no question was raised as 
to the propriety of her eligibility for retirement or as to the 
physical facts which necessitated it. 
In School District No. 1 v. Teachers' Retirement Fund 
Assn., 163 Ore. 103 [95 P.2d 720, 96 P.2d 419, 125 A.L.R. 
720], a statute which provided for a pension plan for teachers 
under the age of 60 who should become disabled by reason 
of illness or accident was involved. The board of directors 
of the school district adopted a rule requiring every applicant 
to take a medical examination and where a physical disability 
was discovered, the applicant was to sign a waiver of any 
claim for disability benefits from the Teachers' Retirement 
Fund Association. The waivers were held void as contrary 
to public policy. 
I have no quarrel with cases holding that a public em-
ployee may be retired on a pension or removed from office 
or position for physical disability when there is statutory 
authority therefor. I do object strenuously to such judicial 
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legislation as is found in the majority opinion. If the legis-
lative body intends that an employee, in the position of the 
plaintiff here, may be removed from his position, it is its sole 
prerogative to say so. It is not the function of this court 
to determine that the charter provision, so obviously meant 
to provide for the discharge of an employee guilty of mis-
conduct, applies to one suffering from a physical disability. 
If, as I am convinced it does, the charter makes no provision 
for the removal of a person in the category in which plain-
tiff finds himself, undoubtedly the situation could be remedied 
by the pr·oper authorities in a very short period of time. It 
is not the duty of this court to supply the missing links in 
the legislative chain. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment with directions 
to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff 
directing his restoration to his position in the Department of 
Fire of the City of Los Angeles without loss of pay. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 31, 
1952. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 21820. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1952.] 
CITY OF VERNON et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Injunctions- Violation- Certainty.- Petitioners cannot be 
guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is so 
uncertain that they could not determine what it required them 
to do. 
[2] Id.-Judgment.-In California resort may be had to the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty 
or ambiguity in an injunction. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Injunctions, § 78; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 334. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, § 91; [2, 3, 5] Injunc-
tions, §74; [4] Injunctions, §109(2); [6,7] Contempt, §42; [8] 
Contempt, §55; [9,11] Contempt, §56; [10] Contempt, §80; 
[12, 13 J Contempt, § 32; [14] Injunctions, § 90.5; [15] Contempt, 
§ 68. 
